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ABSTRACT 
Examining the ambiguous concept of usury, this article retraces political battles over the 
epistemic framings of the everyday economy in the nineteenth century. It takes a comparative 
approach to the legal and economic debates on usury in the Habsburg and the German empires in 
the wake of the economic crisis of the late 1870s, when new laws against usury were introduced. 
In the respective debates, diverging political interests and class attitudes pitted different 
conceptualisations of economic exchange against each other. At stake were the diverse forms of 
commensuration and valuation scales in received credit practices. The new legislation on usury 
centred on the notion of a usurer’s victim who supposedly was incapable of rational economic 
action and thus in need of civilisation. By way of conclusion, this article relates the story of 
nineteenth-century usury legislation to current debates among historians on capitalism and the 
emergence of the economy as a bounded entity. It argues for more analytical attention to 
historical conflicts over modes of exchange as they came to the fore in the debates on usury, and 
discusses the implications of this perspective for the history of economic liberalism. 
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Usury is an ambiguous concept, uneasily pairing economy and morality. Today, we might 
associate usury with the ban on interest in the Middle Ages, which drew the line between an 
economy of salvation and the world of trade.1 Alternatively, as has been argued by Albert 
Hirschman, the history of the French and English term ‘interest’ shows how ‘interest’ gradually 
left the sphere of finance and its negative association with usury, ultimately coming to signify 
rational, calculated, goal-oriented action as such.2 In the German of the early modern period, 
usury was a multi-faceted, politically charged concept that brought together a number of 
illegitimate market practices, such as forestalling, hoarding, and profiteering. However, it 
gradually disappeared after 1848 with the decline of the early modern politics of provision, only 
to suddenly come up again in the urban consumer protests of First World War.3 Usury thus 
appears as something untimely, far removed from the cycles of a modern economy. Yet, in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century usury had a specific meaning, and this essay deals with it 
and it alone: it signified a discourse of order on the relationship between creditor and debtor and a 
diagnosis of a perceived crisis. In the concluding decades of the nineteenth century, usury was 
made into an object of legal reasoning, economic theory, social-scientific expertise, and anti-
Semitic mobilisation. This was a new situation, because by the middle of the nineteenth century, 
all of the German-speaking states had repealed existing laws on usury, which had limited the 
permitted rates of interest on credit. Yet only about ten years later, they all reintroduced new 
usury laws: first in 1877 in the eastern parts of the Habsburg Empire, then in some Swiss cantons, 
in 1880 in the German Empire, and in 1881 for the whole Habsburg Empire. In 1893, the 
juridical scope of the concept of usury was expanded, and the laws in the German Empire revised 
accordingly. 
These new laws on usury reframed the problem. No longer was usury defined by a legal 
restriction on interest rates. Rather, it was defined by the creditor’s exploitation of a debtor’s 
distress, economic inexperience, or carelessness. Whether an act constituted usury was thus no 
longer determined by an objective measure, but by the subjective situation of the victim. The 
criterion was the debtor’s economic behaviour. The economist and social theorist Lorenz von 
Stein succinctly summed up this new conception of usury in 1880 by calling usury a ‘debt that 
reproduces itself’ (‘eine Schuld, die sich selbst gebiert’). This ‘debt that reproduces itself’ led a 
debtor, who was forced to take up ever-new debt, to lose his ‘means for economical calculation’, 
or, his ‘business sense’.4 Lorenz von Stein portrayed usury as a vicious circle spiralling around a 
problem of economic rationality, that is, the ‘business sense’ that the debtor stood to lose. 
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In what follows, I trace the transformation of usury as a discourse of order and a diagnosis 
of crisis. I am interested in an aspect of the history of economic rationality that appears in the 
conflicting conceptions of economic exchange that were at stake in the debates on usury. 
Economic rationality is treated as a native category here; that is, I look at how academic experts, 
politicians, bureaucracies, journalists, and everyday creditors and debtors framed the economic as 
a problem of temporal metrics and subject orientation. My argument is in dialogue with historical 
research on the epistemic production of the economic, and specifically, on the emergence of 
valuation scales, statistical aggregates, informational infrastructures, and conceptual foundations, 
which became salient in various fields after the 1870s – for example, in the debates on the limits 
of finance and futures trading, in the global arrangement of day time, in the separation of national 
economy and world economy, or in the institution of the gold standard.5 
When late nineteenth-century experts debated the problem of usury, they pitted different 
conceptualisations of economic exchange against each other. Opposing political interests and 
class attitudes came to the fore when, for example, agrarian capitalists expressed fears of a loss of 
control over the rural population by a perceived spread of usury, or when middle-class social 
reformers argued for the modernization of credit markets, or when bourgeois politicians corralled 
the discourse of usury into the sphere of consumption, in order to suppress demands made by 
social democrats, who, in turn, took up the discourse of usury to argue for higher wages. Such 
political battles were imbricated with changing epistemic framings of the everyday economy, and 
I thus argue for a heightened awareness of the interlacement of socio-structural contradictions 
and epistemic tensions. Importantly, though not always, the problem of usury was framed as a 
problem of an imperial periphery, where different currencies, measures of value, and received 
practices of exchange collided with requirements ushered in from the imperial centre, leading to 
ever-new contradictions. By recovering discourses in the imperial centre that grappled with 
exchange practices in the periphery I do not wish to suggest a binary division between centre and 
periphery; rather, one might speak of ‘central peripheries’, because the periphery here was a site 
of encounter where the form of economic rationality was given shape.6 Accordingly, my 
perspective is informed by historical studies of colonial economies such as that of Manu 
Goswami, who shows how British imperial projects thrust aside Indian currencies and exchange 
practices thereby shaping the colonial economy as a distinct spatio-temporal object, and of  Ritu 
Birla, who depicts how British imperialists suppressed what she terms ‘vernacular capitalism’.7 
In the German-speaking discourse of usury, however, notions of ‘backward’ underclasses and 
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anti-Semitic demonization of existing exchange relations stretched over the semi-colonized East 
and the non-colonial centre alike. Rather than asking whether usury really existed or not, the 
method I follow is to reconstruct comparatively these thematisations of usury through which 
which, by way of social conflict, the economy as an object of knowledge and economic 
rationality took shape as a distinct form of orientation. 
 
 
Transformations of a diagnosis of crisis 
 
It was not only the reintroduction of usury laws that took place under the auspices of crisis; their 
repeal was also itself the product of crisis. Ironically, the rhetoric of a state of emergency 
motivated both their repeal as well as their renewed adoption. In the fall of 1857, as a wave of 
bankruptcies caused by the ‘effects of the American economic crisis’ were emanating from the 
port city of Hamburg and spreading general ‘mistrust and lack of credit’ in the German business 
world, the Prussian State Ministry initiated the temporary repeal of interest limits for certain 
types of loans in order to revive the credit market.8 These measures were renewed during the 
1866 Austro-Prussian War, and in 1867 usury laws were definitively abolished in the North 
German Confederation followed by the Habsburg Empire in 1868.9 Drawing on a tradition of 
political-economic debate on interest in works like Jeremy Bentham’s Defence of Usury, some 
German economists commended the deregulation of interest in the name of free trade, 
competition, and innovation.10 Bentham had positioned himself against Adam Smith, who had 
argued that unregulated interest rates would bring about a situation in which ‘prodigals and 
projectors’ fraught with risk would come to outnumber all other borrowers in the credit market.11 
However, it was not matters of principle but pragmatic interventions that laid the foundations for 
the spread of the idea that money, ‘like every other commodity, is subject to the law of 
competition of supply and demand according to its respective price’, as a Habsburg minister put 
it in 1858.12 All this changed in the wake of the Panic of 1873 and the cascade of crises that 
followed it. The Long Depression was a protracted process of deflation, shrinking growth and 
sales crises.13 Academic experts and politicians came to ‘reform economic law’ with correctives 
for liberalism, as one contemporary formulated it.14 Economists accepted the laws of free 
competition, but they believed that these laws were only in full force in certain spheres, such as 
the ‘world market’ or the ‘stock exchange’.15 Economy was thus conceived of as a multi-level 
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system in which everyday life seemed backward: ‘in the lowest strata of trade’, ‘the parochial 
relations that correspond to the lower levels of culture’ would retain their validity. Small-time 
borrowers would not take credit for productive purposes, but in states of ‘bitter need’, and would 
be unable to consider the consequences due to their ‘lack of education’. Drawing on classics like 
the works of Wilhelm Roscher, it was consensus among economists that ‘the doctrines of 
political economy’ could only be applied to ‘civilized conditions’, and thus that applying the 
principals of free competition in countries with a ‘lower level of development’ was out of the 
question.16 Protection and education in everyday economic relations were concerns whose 
urgency was underscored by the declaration of a state of emergency. In the Habsburg Reichsrat, 
Galician representatives drew a picture of a region ravaged by usury, and an economist from 
Czernowitz seconded them when speaking of Bukovina: ‘We have no organic society here, no 
people, no nation’, just peasants ‘whose depressed being and slavishly subservient comportment’ 
would be immediately apparent to every foreign visitor. 17  In 1879, after Upper Silesia 
experienced crop failures and flooding, the Prussian Landtag too debated declaring a ‘state of 
emergency’ in this region near the border with Russia; during the debate, the minister of finance 
reported that usury had ‘spun up’ the ‘in itself poor and harried population’ with an 
‘indestructible net’.18  
The rhetoric of the state of emergency called up questions of imperial power, control, and the 
need for civilising measures: imperial experts expressed fears about the dynamics of exchange 
relations on the periphery. They debated the ‘problem of freedom’ in a post-manorial society, a 
problem that transnational historians have researched with particular focus on labour relations 
and race in the ‘protectorates’, the German east, and the ‘inner mission’.19 It is useful to extend 
such findings on labour relations to exchange relations. Thus some aspects of the political-
economic aftermath of the Panic of 1873, which have been debated by historians ever since the 
publication of Hans Rosenberg’s Große Depression und Bismarckzeit, might be revisited albeit 
from a different perspective.20 By treating the problem of economic rationality, the question of 
liberalism’s decline ceases to occupy centre stage. Rather, I seek to illuminate proponents’ 
projected reconfigurations of liberalism, which aimed to restitute the market as a regime of truth 
through the use of protection, education, and state intervention. Such a perspective is tangential 
to, yet different from, a line of thought informed by Critical Theory, according to which the very 
form of capitalism – a mode of domination whose social practices are themselves founded in 
abstractions – occasioned distorted understandings of social relations, or, in other words, 
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fetishistic world views.21 Thus, finance capital was taken as the cause of crises, circulation was 
seen as the centre of exploitation, and anonymous forces were personalized and projected onto 
the image of the Jewish manipulator. This is a strong thesis, deductively arguing from a vantage 
point of capitalism’s systemic characteristics. In contradistinction, however, I want to analyse 
something quite specific, namely, the constitutive elements of unpredictability, lack of 
transparency, and disjointed temporality that, in the eyes of the diagnosticians of crisis, had to be 
combated in the fight against usury. Discourses on backwardness, understood as ‘a sense of lag 
and consciousness of lack’, were crucial for usury as diagnosis of crisis.22 What is more, 
academic experts of the time did not exclusively – and not even primarily – focus on finance, but 
rather on received practices of borrowing and calculation. One historian has spoken of the 
‘double helix of economic anti-Semitism’ in order to describe how Jews were simultaneously 
depicted as filthy paupers and as plutocratic conspirators; in both cases, Jews were seen as 
marginal, parasitic, and powerful. In the discourse on usury, the pauperized underside of this 
double helix was, in a sense, dominant.23  
 
A new concept of usury in the Habsburg Empire 
 
In November 1874, a trial began in Vienna that fuelled the debates on usury laws in the eastern 
parts of the Empire. Getzel Wilkenfelde stood before the judge, a man in his mid-50s from 
Galicia who was described in the press as illiterate: ‘he can only count’.24 During the trial, which 
ended in the summer of 1875 with a sentence of three years incarceration, Wilkenfelde’s 
supposed crimes were viewed in the context of the debates on usury in the Galician Landtag.25 
Together with his two sons, Wilkenfelde was accused of engaging in fraudulent loan practices in 
Vienna. However, this was not his first appearance in the newspapers: in their reports on earlier 
trials in which he was either plaintiff or witness, the Viennese papers had described Wilkenfelde, 
who wore traditional Polish-Jewish clothing and spoke in dialect, as a ‘living caricature’.26 
During the trial against Wilkenfelde, the alleged usurer was depicted in a derisive manner rather 
than as a powerful manipulator. Nevertheless, press coverage depicted the case as exemplary for 
the state of things in the Empire’s east: Wilkenfelde was ‘the unspeakably awful embodiment of 
unspeakably awful conditions’.27 This set the stage for debates in the Reichsrat that December, 
which were initiated by a query from the conservative Polish representative from Galicia, 
Andrzej Rydzowski.28 In the ensuing parliamentary debate and up until the passage of the ‘Law 
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on Remedies against Dishonest Actions in Credit Transactions’ for Galicia in 1877, the concept 
of usury congealed into an interpretive framework whose constituent elements were nevertheless 
diverse. During the debate, the right attacked the government and linked the need to protect 
farmers to an allegedly rapacious ‘finance liberalism’.29 However, the bill was also well received 
by liberals because it did not set a limit on interest rates; rather, it was modelled on analogous 
parts of laws on commerce protections for minors.30 The law made the criterion for determining 
whether an action was usury the ‘mental incapacity’ of the person usured, a notion that 
encompassed ‘inexperience in business matters’, a temporary financial ‘hardship’, or a 
‘discomposure of the mind’ as a result of alcohol consumption.31 Thus, the law did not denote a 
sharp conceptual turn: as early as 1866, similar clauses had been formulated that reflected a long-
standing view that credit transactions that exploited the borrower’s ‘inexperience or hardship’ 
were to be prohibited.32 However, in the 1870s, the common sense idea that certain market actors 
should be protected was articulated in a different context and was more politically charged than 
before. 
Structural changes in the property and credit markets in Galicia were one factor that fed fears 
about usury. After the abolition of serfdom in 1848, Jewish creditors replaced manorial lords as 
intermediaries. In 1867, restrictions on Jews in the real estate markets were repealed. Making up 
about 13% of the population in eastern Galicia, Jews entered the agricultural trade – without, 
however, ever attaining a dominant position – and became increasingly visible as non-
institutional creditors in the second half of the 1870s.33 Added to that was a wave of forced 
sales.34 There was an outcry in the Reichsrat when representative Rydzowski released the 
numbers during a debate on usury legislation: the number of forced sales would increase every 
year by 150%, and their number in 1874 was 525% greater than in 1867, the last year before the 
repeal of usury laws.35 In contrast, the liberal representative Max Menger put these numbers in a 
different context, referring to the fact that, relative to the number of property owners and the area 
of the crown land, Galicia had seen less forced sales than other regions. He claimed that Galicia 
was going through ‘necessary, natural processes’ that were slowly allowing mid-sized and large 
farms to sprout up after the abolition of the manor system.36 Additionally, liberal representatives 
argued that the Polish landed aristocracy also demanded high interest rates, not just Jewish 
creditors.37 An accepted fact was agriculture’s heightened need for capital, which was caused by 
the fact that estates could now be divided and by the development of new methods of harvest. 
The forced sales were often undertaken by banks, and after 1880 primarily so.38 Nevertheless, 
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experts advocated for the expansion of institutional credit in the territory, which was plagued by a 
lack of capital.39 Galicia ultimately became dependent on superregional financial flows. This was 
coupled with bolstered mechanisms of exclusion, first and foremost directed against the 
intermediary role of Jews.40 Credit unions, whose implementation experts recommended, played 
a decisive role in the exclusion of Jews and the ‘ethnicisation of social relations’.41 As contact 
zones for credit transactions, the taverns in particular stirred anxieties. Taverns were associated 
with Jews and dubious contracts were attributed to alcohol consumption.42 Thus, the 1877 usury 
law for Galicia was passed together with a law to combat drunkenness. The anti-Semitically 
loaded alcohol question and the usury law overlapped: both aimed to draw cultural boundaries 
and both honed in on the problem of insufficient rationality. Ranking Viennese civil servants 
initially claimed that the new usury law was only suitable for the ‘wholly unique circumstances in 
Galicia’ and that it could not be applied elsewhere.43 Yet not long thereafter it was indeed applied 
elsewhere, as in 1881 the law was expanded to the whole of Austria. The reason for this was that 
the results of the debate corresponded well with widely held wishes for educating responsible, 
consciously economic subjects, pursued particularly by liberals.44 
 
 
From the periphery to the centre: the debate in the German Empire 
 
The debate in the German Empire shared two features with the debate in the Habsburg Empire. 
First, it was also stoked by a crisis situation on the periphery, and second, it was initiated by 
political forces on the right, who nevertheless were pushing an agenda that was spread across the 
political spectrum. During the state of emergency in Upper Silesia mentioned above, crop failures 
and poverty were debated as issues of power in local exchange relations. Representatives claimed 
that smaller farmers would ‘fall into a state of dependency on their creditors’, who would in turn 
treat them ‘almost as slaves’. 45  They believed that the Polish speaking population was 
characterized by a ‘lack of business sense [and] thriftiness, slavishly frivolous joyousness, and 
unreliability’.46 A district administrator from Ratibor proposed setting up a ‘dictatorship’ for a 
period of 10 years and subjecting the population to ‘a strict, yet good-willed regime’.47 Such 
ideas from the circles of the large landowners recalled the Junkers’ loss of power during the 
abolition of serfdom. The Junker Hans Hugo von Kleist-Retzow, who took the decisive initiative 
in the Reichstag on the matter, related farmers’ dependency on debts to concerns about a loss of 
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control over the rural population: ‘We used to have suzerainty and homage; they were based on 
fiefs, on fidelity and trust, above and below […].’ He continued by claiming that today, ‘the 
powerful, egoistic domination of capital without moral foundations’ ruled over the people.48 In 
this conservative attack, Kleist-Retzow exploited the whole rhetorical arsenal of plutocracy and 
senselessly calculating abstraction that had become a widely spread tropes after the Panic of 
1873.49 For the right, the usury debate provided the foundations for an alliance between the 
Catholic Centre Party and the Conservatives by enabling both to draw on popular arguments of 
the anti-Semites.50 However, while Centre representatives wanted to place limits on interest rates 
and restrict the right to sign bills of exchange to merchants, the proposals of the Conservatives 
were not geared towards such policies.51 According to one contemporary, by modelling itself on 
the Galician law and making the ‘exploitation’ of hardship, carelessness, or inexperience into the 
criteria for usury, the Conservative proposal was ‘ten times as liberal’ as the laws of liberal 
governments in other countries.52 The semantics of ‘exploitation’ brought a concept into the 
debate that made exceptional, radically unequal relations and moral outrage into objects of 
juridical discretion. With this came a turn away from legal positivism and a demand for the 
introduction of ethical values into the economy. The newly discovered malleability of society that 
found its expression in protective tariffs and social insurance proved itself adaptable to classic 
postulates of education.53 In a treatise on usury and pawning, Gustav Schmoller, the most 
influential member of the historical school of economics, claimed that economic institutions were 
malleable entities – ‘just forms’ – that were supposed to ‘serve higher purposes, above all the 
education of society’.54 For all practical purposes, the usury law was not aimed at the world of 
finance: expert opinions from the regional branches of the Reichsbank as well as hundreds of 
letters from banks, savings banks, and credit unions had warned against placing restrictions on 
credit transactions and other financial instruments. The debate on usury was carried out in 
sweeping terms, often drawing on anti-Semitic discourses that articulated the problem of debt as 
part of the ‘Jewish question’.55 However, in doing so, it tended to compartmentalize the issue. 
‘Exploitation’ was accordingly defined as a set of asymmetrical power relations and distortions 
revolving around a subject who proved to be unfit for the realities of the market. In the German 
debate, officers and students were repeatedly referenced:56 Young men who were bound to an 
economy of honour and who were thus seen as being susceptible to falling victim to nefarious 
usurers, and, by extension, to destroying their families’ savings and reputation.57 Due to the fact 
that they were only partially integrated in market relations and thus occupied a special role in 
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commercial society, it was believed that these persons should be protected. According to experts, 
another dangerous aspect of usury was the fact that it brought together heterogeneous frames of 
reference. This showed itself not only in the supposedly superior intelligence of the usurer, but 
above all in the opaque exchange relations of everyday economic life. 
 
Peripheral monies and exchange practices 
 
What constituted these relations that so bothered academic experts that they thought they should 
be done away with? As historians of empires have shown, trade practices on the periphery have 
never been separate from developments in the centre.58 Rather than speak of whole systems like 
‘the market economy’ or ‘local society’, it seems more appropriate to research smaller, more 
specific interfaces, like the various valuation scales in use at the time.59 On the periphery, in 
places like Upper Silesia or Galicia, various forms of currency (paper, coins, metals) were in 
circulation, and each had specific, yet variable rates of conversion; different metrics for 
calculation were in use (the decimal system being just one); debts were laid down in a number of 
different contract forms and systems of notation; and their payment became due in different 
rhythms. As economic anthropologists have shown, in inconstant heterogeneous markets, 
marginal yields through arbitrage rather than the exchange of equivalents are the norm. 
Correspondences were produced by the constant conversion of distinct forms of value rather than 
pre-existing it. Part and parcel of this mode of exchange was the use of bills of exchange which 
circulated as surrogates for money and were subject to a heightened compulsion to pay. Another 
aspect of peripheral economies was the practice of allowing debts to stand beyond their due date. 
Such elastic payment dates guaranteed the sort of flexibility necessary for a precarious economy, 
but they also gave occasion for conflict. Just as common were special forms of billing, such as 
the practice of taking a kreutzer per owed guilder as interest on short-term loans (which adds up 
to an annual rate of about 52%).60 Conventions like taking a bushel of wheat as interest in the fall 
catered to the cyclical need for money in agriculture.61 Instalment payments that were set up in 
such a way that going into forbearance made the entire debt immediately due were used for 
mortgages as well as for products like sewing machines. This sped up the tempo of the rural 
economy’s seasonal rhythms.62 Local exchange relations were not autochthonous or traditional, 
however. Rather, received practices were subject to constant change. The standards of 
commensuration underwent shifts with the institution of new national and imperial currencies.63 
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Implemented in the German Empire in 1873, the gold standard was the object of attacks by 
export-oriented big farmers. Because silver coins were gathered up and sold in the process of 
shifting to the gold standard, the price of silver sank. This worsened the terms of trade with 
Russian grain exporters, because Russia had kept its silver currency and could thus sell its grain 
on the world market for less.64 On the local level, the new standards of commensuration caused 
confusion as new currencies with their own values and metrics overlapped with old ones. Civil 
servants in Upper Silesia reported that the ‘most dangerous and violent of these intelligent 
interest usurers’, the ‘Semites’, monopolized the new Reichsbank money.65  
This plurality of modes of exchange increasingly became the object of criticism. 
Intermediaries attracted the distrust of state institutions, and Jews – in their alleged role as 
brokers, traders, peddlers, emigration agents, innkeepers, and money lenders – came to be seen as 
fundamentally suspicious.66 Civil servants both at the centre and on the periphery used these anti-
Semitic associations, as a case from the Habsburg Empire amply demonstrates. In 1876, Anton 
Rawro, a wealthy farmer from the Sambor district in Galicia, petitioned the emperor for relief 
because his accusation against a Jewish creditor had failed in court. According to the report of the 
Ministry of Justice, Rawro had arranged a period of forbearance with the creditor. In the process, 
a promissory note was made out for 300 guilders of the old Viennese currency, which the rural 
population were still using in their calculations, or 120 guilders of the new Austrian currency. 
The illiterate farmer symbolically signed the note by touching the pen in the hand of a witness 
who actually signed the note, an ‘unknown Israelite’, as the report states.67 The Ministry of 
Justice recommended that Rawro’s petition be accepted. Symbolic acts like the almost magical 
touching of a pen, divergent forms of calculation like the old Viennese and the new Austrian 
currencies, selectively remembered, unidentified witnesses like the ‘unknown Israelite’ all 
appeared as elements in a conspiracy that the helpless farmer had walked right into. 
 Jews were depicted here as manipulators in a backwards world. This discourse was less 
concerned with the abstract notion of finance in general and more with the desire to bring order to 
a situation that was viewed as being plagued with opacity. However, the provinces sent news that 
complicated this view. A letter from Upper Silesia found that general poverty and a lack of 
capital were responsible for the hardships there, and not usury.68 Also, it was not only personal 
credit that made up the fabric of local exchange relations, as formalized credit relations played a 
role too. Formalized relations had a force that endangered their non-formal surroundings. From 
the perspective of the everyday practices of the province, formalities like maintaining a bank 
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account, taking somebody to court, or mobilizing a legal document were not givens, but concrete, 
tiresome, and risky. 69  Thus, complaints from Galicia viewed bank institutions and their 
formalities more as part of the problem than as part of the solution. For instance, in 1868 Galician 
elites founded the so-called ‘Rustikal-Bank’ [‘Rustic Bank’], which gave farmers seeking credit 
promissory notes with variable rates of exchange rather than cash. Letters of protest soon reached 
Vienna complaining that the ‘Rustikal-Bank’ was more of a usurer than the private lenders.70 A 
petition from thirteen districts in Lemberg described the ‘public usury’ of the bank institutes as a 
bureaucratic nightmare. A man seeking credit was left to fend for himself against the grueling 
formalities of the bank, was made to pay hefty fees, and in the end received notes of shifting 
value instead of cash, and was forced to pay even more fees if he fell into forbearance.71  
Under such circumstances, money was only partially fungible. The problems of conversion 
are made clear by the example of the so-called cattle lease, a complex form of ownership and 
credit that arose out of precarious economic conditions. With the cattle lease, a merchant gave a 
farmer a young cow, who raised it until it had one or two calves. At the end, the cow and calves 
were sold, the original price of the cow subtracted from the sum, and the remaining profits split 
two ways. In the meantime, the farmer had the cow’s milk, but he had to supply the feed. If the 
cow died, he had to pay for it out of pocket. One case from Alsace tells how a farmer loaned a 
young cow for 50 marks, held it until it had two calves, and, after four years, sold all three 
animals. In the end, the cow sold for 300 marks, the first calf for 150, and the second for 50. The 
sum of 500 marks split two ways brought the farmer 250 marks. A representative from an 
agricultural association calculated that if the farmer had borrowed the original 50 marks at 5% 
interest, he would have only owed 60 marks and 79 cents after four years and had the 500 marks 
all for himself.72 Observers found that the cattle lease was a widespread practice in the southwest 
and west of the German Empire, where the custom of partible inheritance meant that there were 
many independent farmers with small properties. The practice reached its high point in 1879.73 
Yet statistics were hard to come by. Observers remarked that the farmers were largely silent on 
these issues and believed this had to do with their social aspirations: for reasons of prestige, 
farmers wanted to have as many cows in their stalls as possible. They would thus conceal the 
truth of their ownership out of shame and, in their mistrust against other farmers, be quickly 
taken advantage of.74 ‘Added to that’, an agricultural expert remarked, was the fact ‘that, in 
general, farmers have greater trust in merchants than they do in their own’.75 In attributing 
farmers with a ‘greater trust’ towards merchants, what was at issue were relations between 
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farmers and merchants, Jewish and non-Jewish, in which different ideas about what constituted 
correct economic behaviour were also in play. Thus, these relations were more complex than 
anti-Semitic publicists and officials made them out to be, a point I will come back to below.76  
 
A reordering of exchange relations 
While imperial constellations certainly gave significant impulses to the debates on usury, some of 
the exchange practices discussed above should make it clear that the discourse of usury cannot 
wholly be ascribed to the conditions of the periphery. A look at Switzerland, where new usury 
laws were also put on the books, might serve to illustrate this point. In the spring of 1879, shortly 
after the passage of the usury law for Galicia, the Canton Solothurn in northwest Switzerland – 
not exactly a semi-colonial territory – followed with its own law.77 As in Zurich and Basel, usury 
was discussed in association with peddling and pawning, that is, exchange relations in the sphere 
of consumption, not rural mortgages.78 As the Swiss examples show, the notions of order that 
found their expression in the discourse of usury could be adapted to diverse contexts, and could 
always be expanded upon. Its frequency as a topic of discussion stood in sharp contrast to the 
actual number of court cases. After the passage of the usury law in Germany in 1880, the number 
of accusations was insignificant, the number of convictions even smaller. One statistical source 
counted, for the whole empire, 261 accusations and 98 convictions in 1882 and 131 accusations 
and 37 convictions in 1885.79 These low numbers notwithstanding, during the 1880s usury 
became an object of debate in the social sciences like never before: in 1887, the Verein für 
Socialpolitik [Association for Social Policy] – the German Empire’s most prestigious social-
scientific institution –  published a study that gave anti-Semitic ideas a heretofore unseen degree 
of approval from social scientists. The definition of usury was expanded beyond the limits of the 
credit business, and in 1893, the Empire’s usury law was revised. The debates of the 1880s show 
how all kinds of economic relations could be made ‘legible’ as instances of usury. 
Two factors fuelled the expansion of the usury debate in the 1880s: the work of credit 
unions and political anti-Semitism, which was becoming a political force of its own right. The 
debate was no longer concerned with semi-colonial conditions, but with the established markets 
of places in the Empire’s west and southwest like the Saarland, Rhineland-Palatinate, Baden, 
Württemberg, and Hessen. Thus, to take an example, a petition from an anti-usury association in 
the Saarland hastened the adoption of stricter legislation in 1893.80 The focus was on the ways 
independent farmers in places with partible inheritance ran their farms. According to some 
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observers, their parcelled properties inhibited them from developing the foresight of 
businessmen. The credit unions too held up the ideal of independence.81 They grafted notions of 
rural community onto the market economy and gave them a national scope. They homogenized 
the practices of their members and at the same time systematized social exclusion. As economic 
historians have shown, credit unions like the Raiffeisenkassen – which originated in the 
Rhineland – used the social control they had acquired in the villages to gain an information 
advantage on the market.82 Indeed their precise knowledge of their clientele made it easy for 
them to sanction delinquent debtors. In this way, the credit unions exploited traditional social 
relations in order to usher in new economic systematicity. 
The other factor, in part related to the credit associations, was anti-Semitic agitation. As a 
historical study on Kurhessen has shown, Otto Böckel – in 1887 the first political anti-Semite in 
the Reichstag – was able to mobilize a segment of voters not reached by the existing parties.83 
Böckel took over a weekly paper that had formerly been called the ‘Usury Pill’, agitated in 
writings such as his brochure The Jews, the Kings of Our Time, which saw over 100 editions, and 
made rural usury the main topic of his racially anti-Semitic, anti-elite politics.84 In stark contrast 
to the high ideal of economic self-sufficiency and the bogeyman of the Jewish ‘property butcher’, 
Böckel’s constituency was made up of the rural underclasses, people who generally did not own 
land or cattle. The imaginary victims of the ‘property butchers’ or cattle dealers, and precisely the 
people who had the most contact with mortgage creditors and cattle dealers, Jewish and non-
Jewish alike, namely the independent farmers, were not those who supported the populist anti-
Semites. The discourse reclaimed a general dichotomy (‘productive’ vs. ‘money grubbing’), but 
its social locus was specific. This is not to say that landowning farmers did not have anti-Semitic 
views, but only that a certain political exploitation of this discourse was divorced from the real 
experiences of farmers with Jewish merchants.85 The practical role credit organizations played as 
a sort of self-help instrument for getting credit went hand in hand with the denigration of Jewish 
merchants in the press and the pursuit of cases against them in the courts. Anti-usury associations 
sued merchants and the anti-Semitic press exploited the proceedings.86 In this regard, the usury 
discourse had a violent presence in the countryside; and yet, the dichotomies of this discourse 
tend to conceal the commonalities between Christians and Jews with respect to trading practices. 
Historians of the rural economy have uncovered instances of cooperation between Christians and 
Jews – as well as, for sure, violence against the latter – and have demonstrated that both groups 
often worked with shared measures of what constituted fair business.87 This shows not least in the 
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fact that Jewish institutions repeatedly condemned usury. Such sources are difficult to interpret. 
They might be informed by a strategy seeking to dispel any occasion for allegations against the 
community, no matter how chimerical. However, there is also evidence that these Jewish 
responses contain genuine reflections on economic fairness.88 
The most influential intervention on the topic from the social sciences – the Verein für 
Socialpolitik’s 1887 investigation – sought to put an end to these rural exchange relations. The 
report, entitled Usury on the Countryside, brought together a broad spectrum of commentators – 
both in respect to academic discipline and political conviction – from 27 different states and 
provinces in the German Empire. Despite the expanse of the area covered and the authority of the 
publishers, the report in no way presented ‘disinterested’ facts that transcended politics, which 
the Verein otherwise claimed to do. In fact, this was not even its goal, as the controversy about 
the report’s methodology demonstrates.89 The Verein had sent a questionnaire to agricultural 
groups and local governments and evaluated material published by the Prussian State Economic 
Collegiate [preußisches Land-Ökonomie-Kollegium]. 90  The report presented hardly a single 
verifiable case study. The Verein did not do anything to make the discrete pieces of data 
comparable with one another, and hardly assembled any statistical material. Instead, the 
publication consisted of a series of stereotyped stories. It repeatedly told of how scheming usurers 
preyed on unknowing victims. Even though the report’s chief editor claimed that explicitly 
defamatory portions were rewritten, the majority of the reports were defined by anti-Semitic 
slander.91 The statistician Gottlieb Schnapper-Arndt criticized the study’s methodology. He first 
pointed out that statistical material clearly could have been gathered, even if there was no extant 
data on the frequency of usury per se. In that case, an observable phenomenon could be viewed 
as a ‘symptom’ or, in today’s parlance, as an indicator of a superordinate yet statistically 
unobservable phenomenon.92 If this method too failed to generate statistical data, then the 
plausibility of individual cases, controlled for other factors, had to be checked, optimally by 
gathering contradictory statements from witnesses and submitting them to a ‘critique of 
sources’.93 Individual cases studied in a controlled fashion, he claimed, did not necessarily have 
to result in a ‘report on popular opinion’: ‘The enquête itself is not permitted to be opinion.’94 But 
the Verein had neglected all of these concerns, Schnapper-Arndt concluded. Instead, and usually 
without any real evidence to begin with, the report’s claims mixed divergent levels in a 
syncretistic fashion, so that it often was not even clear if the authors themselves found them 
relevant. Where numbers were given, they were given in undeniably distorted form: for instance, 
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in the report on Trier, only those court cases that ended unfavourably for the accused Jewish 
merchant were listed, or when the accused’s confession was reported in the source as Jewish.95 
Another critic found that the Verein’s questionnaire suggested that every form of brokerage was 
already usury. Thus, the Verein’s report was informed by an abstract ideal of a smooth-running, 
transparent rural market, where the use of information advantages, expertise on market trends, 
and networks was seen as being superfluous and condemnable.96  
A Verein representative countered that interviewees’ statements about Jews belonged to 
the ‘report on popular opinion’ that the Verein planned to produce. Further, he said, the report 
had, above all, a ‘practical’ task, not a ‘scientific’ one. The Verein had only wanted to ‘make the 
public aware of existing damages and suggest ways and means to correct them’, for which 
‘scientific reasoning and quantitative analysis’ were ‘only necessary to a limited extent’.97 
Mobilizing antisemitic sentiment and dignifying itself with the garb of the social sciences, this 
politics was aimed at transforming rural exchange relations. The Verein saw atomized economic 
subjects who lacked business sense: a problem of overwhelmed economic freedom.98 The study’s 
findings fit the rural middle-class politics with which the Verein established itself in the political 
field in the 1880s.99 The suggested improvements ranged from the promotion of institutionalized 
credit through credit unions, measures against partible inheritance, to the education of the 
population in order to ‘lift the intelligence and character of the farmers’.100 Thus, the Verein saw 
the ‘civilisational question’ (‘Kulturfrage’) as consisting of ‘giving the German farmer some of 
the self-confidence, skill, and resourcefulness of the American farmer’.101 Yet for academic 
elites, credit unions were more than just instruments of self-help: they were also seen as an 
instrument of modernization beyond the purview of state subventions. The Verein certainly 
wanted the state to assist the credit unions, but Gustav Schmoller, founder and central personality 
of the Verein, was explicit in his statements against direct state involvement in credit.102 
The usury law of 1880 had regulated monetary credit. In contrast, the expansion of the 
legal definition of usury in the 1893 law was geared towards regulating all kinds of conversions 
between the value of things and monetary value. This added urban milieus to the law’s sphere. 
Pawning, along with the buy-back or layaway businesses that were even more common in 
Germany, were now brought together under the heading ‘object and service usury’ (Sach- und 
Leistungswucher). 103  ‘Object usury’ was notoriously difficult to define. 104  Lawmakers and 
academic experts tried to limit the concept of object usury to a set of clearly outlined exchange 
relations. They were particularly concerned with building a conceptual firewall against demands 
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for higher wages and complaints against landlords that the labour movement might bring up 
under the rubric of usury. Indeed, the labour movement had a long tradition of thematising 
usury.105  Social democrats agitated with demands for a minimum wage by claiming that 
employers were exploiting workers’ hardship, and they denounced protective tariffs that were 
opposed to consumers’ interests as usury, all without success.106 Conversely, in legislative 
discussions, the semantics of usury and anti-Semitism were deployed against the social 
democrats. In turn, the social-democratic newspaper Vorwärts viewed the revised usury law as an 
anti-Semitic ‘class law’ against small Jewish peddlers, while big industrialists or financiers were 
by definition never mentioned.107 The Junker Kleist-Retzow stated in the Reichstag that if one did 
not take measures to contain usury, ‘socialist cravings’ and ‘hate against property owners in 
general’ might take hold of the workers.108 The economist and social theorist Lorenz von Stein, 
quoted in the introduction of this article, viewed usury as a social danger because it stirred up 
‘hatred against capital’ and thus ‘against the entire economic and social order of all human 
things’.109 
Consistent with the circumscribed notion of ‘object usury’, and in order to keep demands 
from the social democrats at bay, one economist wrote that usury always had to have a single 
victim, who had to suffer from exceptional, business-related hardships – mere poverty, hunger, or 
high rent (the latter was too widespread to qualify as usury) were not sufficient.110 In the 1890s, 
the concept of usury became precisely delimited: some parts of livelihood fell into the distinct 
sphere of economy, while others were deemed irrelevant. Usury was seen as an individual, 
exceptional incongruity within the norms of the objective structure called ‘the economy’. 
Historians have debated the emergence of the economy as a bounded conceptual entity in 
history, not the least since Timothy Mitchell put forward the evocative thesis that without distinct 
scientific and bureaucratic tools that were put to use in the interwar period, no such thing as the 
‘the economy’ existed.111 This thesis has been suggestive although contested, and at this point it 
might be useful to point out different historical nodes at which, by way of intense social conflict, 
seemingly self-evident spheres like the economy emerged in their objectivity.112 With regards to 
the question of economic subjecthood, the last quarter of the nineteenth century saw such a 
historical node, and the debates on usury contributed to the respective newly-drawn separation of 
subject and object. One of the conditions that made defining ‘object usury’ possible was an 
emerging knowledge complex that combined administration, philanthropy, and social science. In 
the 1880s, this complex began to conceive of the economy as a distinct, measurable object of its 
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own order.113 This was informed by understandings of the economic as an organized system in 
which certain cycles had their place; a system in which vectorially positioned subjects exchanged 
with one another in transparent infrastructures; a system in which in-groups were separated from 
outsiders; a system whose distinct levels were integrated into the national and world economy.114    
The economy, understood as an objectivized, rule-guided, factually existing system, 
conditioned the way the subjective aspects of economic activity could play out. As an incongruity 
defined in relation to individual subjects, usury no longer needed to be hemmed by an objective 
limit on interest rates, because, according to the running assumption, an economic subject would 
never sign a contract that was obviously against their own interests. Thus the subjective 
dimensions of the economic were defined, which usury legislation sought to inscribe into law in 
the form of protections, common welfare, and the recognition of individual circumstances. 
Moreover, the law also helped shape an individual, rationally oriented subject. At the same 
moment, the so-called Austrian school of economics with its theory of marginal utility was 
conceptualising the economy as a system based on subjective exchanges geared towards 
maximizing individual benefit. Marginalism for sure has various origins, typically associated 
with the names of Stanley Jevons from England, Léon Walras from Switzerland, and Carl 
Menger from Austria.115 In the Habsburg empire, Menger and his successors essentially put 
forward a theory of subjective value; a theory of abstract, subjective exchange. Commentators 
rushed to demonstrate how usury laws were compatible with this new economic theory.116 
Isolating a subject that conformed to the natural laws of the economy like the marginalists did 
provided the guidelines for a civilizing authority that protected backwards, irrational subjects 
against distortions.117 
 
Conclusion 
 
As one historian studying the usury debates pointed out, ‘the First World War marked a 
watershed’.118 During the food riots of the war’s final years, the ‘old’ semantics of usury as a set 
of illegitimate market practices re-emerged. After the war, this semantics was taken up by the 
movements for consumers’ rights and used to express a general concern about social inequalities 
in a developing welfare state. However, as I have tried to show here, usury denoted something 
rather different in the late nineteenth century: a discourse of order and a diagnosis of crisis that 
dramatized certain credit practices and dealt with economic rationality. During the Great 
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Depression of the 1870s, the key political initiative for the passage of new usury legislation came 
from the right. However, they understood the problem of usury in a way that cohered with 
widespread assumptions. Most experts taking part in the debate were by no means anti-capitalist, 
and only a few were romantic-conservative. Defining usury as the exploitation of a deficient 
economic subject who lacked an understanding of the future consequences of taking on debt fit 
well with prevailing notions of civilization and education, two key postulates of liberalism. Thus, 
the new usury laws did not so much mark a turn away from the idea of the market as a regime of 
truth as they served to restore this idea under the auspices of a state-led remapping of the 
economic field.  
Usury as a diagnosis of crisis gave a platform for experts in the imperial centre to debate 
questions of power and control. In the encounter between received forms of commensuration and 
new, rationalized forms, peripheral practices of exchange came to be viewed with suspicion. 
Further, the problem of usury constituted a site of struggles for political interests and class 
attitudes towards precarious everyday economic conditions. Agrarian capitalists expressed their 
fear of the loss of social hierarchy while middle-class reformers such as the Verein für 
Socialpolitik argued for the integration of more parts of the population into expanding cycles of 
finance and accumulation. It would be simplifying things to trace the origins of usury as a 
diagnosis of crisis back to an encounter between the modern market and agricultural economies 
of subsistence. Rather, the debate revolved around alterable received practices (in which market 
expansion also played an important role) that modernizers increasingly found inacceptable. 
This finding has a larger implication for the history of capitalism as it has been debated 
among historians lately. Much of the debate is concerned with the dynamics of dis-embedding, 
and the techniques of re-embedding, of market forces.119 Other historians point out the vast 
spectrum of the commodification of labour in capitalism, and depart from a narrow focus on 
wage labour to include housework and forced labour. In this essay, I have tried to gesture towards 
yet another dimension: that is, conflicts over modes of exchange.120 The conflicts over modes of 
exchange, to which the debates on usury and economic rationality testify, did not bring about a 
singular unfolding logic but ever-new unevenness. Thus, capitalism’s work of subsumption 
placed divergent temporalities in tension with one another and brought clashing forms of 
commensuration to the fore.121 If we retrace how, by the late nineteenth century, a particular 
conflict over the conceptualisation of exchange became a focal point for politics, this suggests 
relating both class struggle and epistemic tension to the dynamics of a political framing such as 
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economic liberalism in that historical moment. Historians have called liberalism an ‘ideology 
fixed on circulation’, and some believe that it was replaced in the years around 1880 by an 
ideology of national production.122 However, if one views usury from an angle of economic 
rationality, a different picture emerges. In epistemological terms, the concept of the economy 
denoted a space with its own facticity, an organized system that comprised multiple, yet 
transparent forces. Anchored in notions of common sense, the juridical definition of usury as 
exploitation of a subjective lack was founded in the basic assumption that the economic sphere 
was complex, yet natural, and in principal comprehensible. Such assumptions made exchange 
into the key problem of economics around 1880. Historians have shown that during late 
nineteenth-century globalization, economic policy was increasingly conceived of as enmeshed in 
competing national forces in an international framework.123 On a conceptual level, the history of 
usury as a diagnosis of crisis offers an observation on this process: around 1880, the problem of 
exchange came to substitute the a priori, unquestioned assumption of circulation. One figuration 
of this shift was marginalism, which reconceived economic life as abstract subjective 
exchange.124 Another was the question of usury. With the latter, diverse valuation scales and local 
intermediaries were abolished through a violent discourse of order in the name of a subject that 
regulated its time and pursued its interests in a calculated, individual, goal-oriented fashion. 
Pitted against this economic subject was the backward subject of usury, who, according to Lorenz 
von Stein, lost the ‘means of economical calculation’ and was consumed by the ‘debt that 
reproduces itself’.125 
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